In this paper, we propose EPIC, an efficient and privacy-preserving data collection scheme with EtoE data integrity verification for advanced metering infrastructure networks. Using efficient cryptographic operations, each meter should send a masked reading to the utility such that all the masks are canceled after aggregating all meters' masked readings, and thus the utility can only obtain an aggregated reading to preserve consumers' privacy. The utility can verify the aggregated reading integrity without accessing the individual readings to preserve privacy. It can also identify the attackers and compute electricity bills efficiently by using the fine-grained readings without violating privacy. Furthermore, EPIC can resist collusion attacks in which the utility colludes with a relay node to extract the meters' readings. A formal proof and probabilistic analysis are used to evaluate the security of EPIC, and ns-3 is used to implement EPIC and evaluate the network performance. In addition, we compare EPIC to existing data collection schemes in terms of overhead and security/privacy features.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE SMART grid initiative aims to develop a clean, reliable, and efficient system. It extensively integrates information technology into the power grid [1] . One main component of the smart grid is the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) networks that connect smart meters (SMs) installed at consumers' side to the electric service provider (the utility). SMs should send fine-grained power consumption readings to the utility to perform real-time monitoring and energy management [2] . Moreover, the utility can reduce the power consumption during peak hours using dynamic pricing approach in which the electricity prices may change during the day to encourage consumers to reduce their power consumption.
However, the fine-grained power consumption readings can reveal sensitive information about the consumers' activities, such as the times consumers leave/return homes, as well as, the appliances they use since each appliance has a unique power consumption signature [3] - [5] . Privacy-preserving data aggregation is a promising technique to enable the utility to obtain an aggregated fine-grained reading from an AMI network without learning the individual readings to preserve the consumers' privacy. However, the existing schemes, such as [6] - [10] , extensively use asymmetric-key cryptography in data aggregation, which typically involves large computation and communication overhead. They also do not address endto-end (EtoE) data integrity in which the utility can ensure that all the individual fine-grained readings are not altered during transmission and aggregation without accessing the individual readings to preserve privacy. Moreover, they do not address EtoE authenticity in which the utility can ensure that the aggregated reading is computed using the fine-grained readings coming from intended consumers. Furthermore, generating electricity bills using the reported fine-grained readings based on dynamic prices is challenging since the utility should not have access to the fine-grained readings to preserve privacy, but these readings are needed to generate consumers' bills.
In this paper, we propose an efficient privacy-preserving scheme with EtoE data integrity, authenticity, and collusionresistance for AMI networks (EPIC). The idea is that each SM selects a number of SMs in the network called "proxies" and efficiently computes shared pairwise secret masks with each proxy. Then, it should mask its fine-grained reading with all the masks shared with the proxies, such that all the masks are canceled after aggregating all meters' masked readings, and thus the utility can only obtain an aggregated reading to preserve consumers' privacy. EPIC can also resist collusion attacks in which the utility can collude with a relay meter to extract a meter's fine-grained readings because readings are masked by several secret masks shared with a number of different proxies. The number of the selected proxies controls the protection level against collusion attack. In addition, to ensure EtoE data integrity and authenticity, a homomorphic 2327-4662 c 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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hash and a hash MAC are computed on each masked reading. Then, hash MACs are aggregated while all the individual homomorphic hashes are forwarded to the utility. Using the individual homomorphic hashes and the aggregated MAC, the utility can ensure the data integrity of each individual finegrained reading and the authenticity of each consumer in the network. Furthermore, the homomorphic hashes can be also used to enable the utility to generate dynamic electricity bills without accessing the individual readings to preserve privacy. Our contributions can be summarized as follows. 1) Efficient and Collusion-Resistant Privacy-Preserving Power Consumption Collection: EPIC uses secure and lightweight operations to efficiently mask the finegrained readings and aggregate the masked readings to enable the utility to collect a fine-grained aggregated reading without leaking the consumers' sensitive information. It can also resist collusion attacks to reveal a meter's readings and allows the SMs to set their protection level. 2) EtoE Data Integrity: Since the meters' reading can be modified during the transmission to the utility, EPIC enables the utility to verify the integrity of the aggregated reading without accessing the individual readings to preserve consumers' privacy. It also enables the utility to identify the attackers who modify the readings. 3) EtoE Authenticity: In EPIC, the utility can ensure that the aggregated reading was computed by the intended users in the network. 4) Dynamic Pricing: Using homomorphic hash properties, EPIC enables the utility to efficiently compute electricity bills based on dynamic pricing without violating consumers' privacy. The results of a formal proof, probabilistic modeling, and analysis demonstrate that EPIC is secure. In addition, ns-3 is used to implement EPIC and evaluate the network performance. The results demonstrate that EPIC is efficient. We also compare EPIC to the existing data collection schemes in terms of overhead and security/privacy features.
A preliminary version of this paper appeared in [11] . The main difference between [11] and this paper are as follows. First, Mohammed et al. [11] did not address EtoE data integrity, EtoE authenticity, attacker identification, dynamic pricing, and details of key management and sharing secret masks offline and efficiently. This paper addresses all these challenges. Second, extensive analysis and simulation have been added to this paper. This includes a formal security proof, a comprehensive security analysis, probabilistic analysis of the collusion attacks and the proposed defense method, and updated ns-3 simulation results against similar existing schemes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the related works. The system models and preliminaries are presented in Section III. The proposed masking and aggregation method is presented in Section IV. The details of EPIC are given in Section V. The security and privacy analysis is given in Section VI, whereas the performance evaluation and experimental results are given in Section VII. Finally, the conclusion is drawn in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORKS
Several schemes have been proposed to collect power consumption readings in AMI networks and wireless sensor networks (WSNs) [6] - [10] , [12] - [14] . Fan et al. [6] used bilinear pairing with an aggregation method based on blind factors and solving the discrete log problem using Pollard's lambda method to obtain the aggregated reading and achieve collusion resistance. Lu et al. [7] used homomorphic encryption to aggregate multidimensional data represented using a superincreasing sequence. Shen et al. [8] proposed cube-data aggregation by using the Paillier cryptosystem and Horners rule. Li et al. [9] proposed the use of two superincreasing sequences with the Paillier cryptosystem to achieve multisubset data aggregation. Li and Luo [10] used homomorphicencryption-based aggregation scheme to send an aggregated reading to the utility. The utility should run anomaly detection system in every data collection round to detect data modification attack, but unlike EPIC, the system suffers from false positive and negatives.
Garcia and Jacobs [13] combined Paillier's homomorphic encryption with additive secret sharing scheme to protect the scheme against collusion attacks. However, the encryption and aggregation complexities of [13] are O(n) and O(n 2 ), respectively, while in EPIC they are O(1) and O(n). Li and Guang [14] used homomorphic MAC and homomorphic hash functions to provide data integrity in WSNs against external attackers only with the assumption that all internal nodes are trusted. Compared to EPIC, homomorphic encryption-based aggregation schemes such as [7] - [10] , [12] , and [13] are inefficient as they require much larger size ciphertext and much more time for encryption, decryption, and aggregation than EPIC.
Knirsch et al. [15] proposed the use of one-time masking for privacy-preserving data aggregation. Specifically, in each data collection round, the SMs are arranged in a ring-based topology to sequentially update the SM masks before masking each fine-grained reading. However, the proposed scheme has several limitations. First, Knirsch et al. [15] can only support single-hop model with a ring-topology communication used for online masks agreement, while EPIC can support both single-hop and multihop models with efficient and offline mask agreement. Second, in each data collection round in [15] , all the ring SMs must communicate sequentially to ensure the correctness of masks updates before the actual reading reporting to the utility begins. This, therefore, increases the time required by the utility to collect the fine-grained readings and limits the network scalability.
Homomorphic linear authenticators (HLAs) [16] have been widely used to achieve data integrity for cloud applications [17] , [18] . In cloud-based applications, each user breaks its data into several blocks, uses its private key to generate an authentication tag for each block and stores these blocks and authentication tags on a cloud server. For data retrieval, a verifier sends a random challenge to the server and then uses the server response along with the users' public keys to ensure data integrity. Therefore, in cloud-based applications, data is not relayed by other users, instead, the data modification attacks can be launched by the cloud server. Different from HLA-based schemes [17] , [18] , EPIC considers a different network and threat models in which data is relayed by other SMs in the AMI network who may launch data modification attacks. Unlike [17] and [18] , EPIC ensures data integrity by using the lightweight homomorphic hash along with an aggregated hash MAC to ensure data integrity as will be explained in Sections V-D and VI-B1.
To sum up, we compare in Table I EPIC against similar schemes. To the best of our knowledge, EPIC is the first solution that aims to achieve efficiency, privacy preservation, hop-by-hop (HbyH) and EtoE data integrity, authenticity and attackers identification, high resistance to collusion attacks, and dynamic pricing-based billing simultaneously for both single-hop and multihop network models.
III. SYSTEM MODELS AND PRELIMINARIES

A. Network Model
As shown in Fig. 1 , the considered network model consists of the utility and service subscribers in a residential area.
Each subscriber's house is equipped with an SM to report fine-grained power consumption readings to the utility every short time interval. SMs can communicate with the utility through a local collector, called gateway. As shown in the figure, EPIC can be used in single-hop or multihop network models. The SMs are connected via a wireless mesh network using Wi-Fi where each meter can act as a router to relay meters' packets to connect them to the gateway. The gateway can communicate to the utility through a wired link with low delay and high bandwidth. For the single-hop model, SMs send reading packets to the gateway which aggregates all the readings, create a new packet, and send it to the utility. For the multihop model, a virtual minimum spanning tree network topology that allows bottom-up aggregation is built. Then, leaf SMs send their readings packets to their parent SM which uses its reading and the packets received from children SMs to create a new packet and forwards it to the next parent SM. This should continue until the utility receives a reading packet.
B. Adversary Model
Attackers could be external adversaries A, or internal network nodes, such as SMs, the gateway, or the utility. Attackers may attempt to invade the consumers' privacy to learn their power consumption patterns. They may also try to breach the data integrity by modifying other meters' data. In addition, A can eavesdrop on all the communications between the different parties to infer any sensitive information about consumers. A can also launch some active attacks such as packet replay and impersonation. Moreover, the attackers can work individually or collude to launch stronger attacks.
C. Preliminaries 1) Bilinear Pairing: Let G 1 be an additive cyclic group, G 2 be a multiplicative cyclic group of the same prime order q, and P be a generator of G 1 . A pairingê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 has the following properties. 1) Bilinearity:ê(aP, bQ) =ê(P, abQ) =ê(abP, Q) = e(P, Q) ab ∈ G 2 ∀ P, Q ∈ G 1 and a, b ∈ Z * q . 2) Nondegeneracy:ê(P, P) = 1 G 2 .
2) Homomorphic Hash Function: Let G be an additive cyclic group of prime order p and has d random generators
Homomorphic hash function is collision resistant, where it is infeasible to find m 1 and m 2 such that H(m 1 ) = H(m 2 ). In addition, homomorphic hash function is one way, where given H(m 1 ), it is infeasible to compute m 1 . Homomorphic hash function also has the following property: H(m 1 + m 2 ) = H(m 1 ) + H(m 2 ). We refer to [19] for more details on homomorphic hash functions.
IV. EFFICIENT AND COLLUSION-RESISTANT AGGREGATION
In this section, we present a collusion-resistant and efficient data aggregation technique that is used in EPIC. We refer to Table II for the main notations and parameters that will be used in this paper.
A. Data Masking 1) Masked Readings: Fig. 2 illustrates the data masking approach used to protect consumer privacy and resist collusion attacks. First, SM i chooses α proxies {P i,1 , . . . , P i,α } and shares a secret mask value s
i,j with each proxy P i,j to be used for reporting the reading of time slot t x . As shown in the figure, each proxy P i,j should add the mask s (t x ) i,j to its fine-grained reading r j , whereas SM i masks its fine-grained reading r i by subtracting the summation of all shared masks with its proxies. After aggregating all masked readings sent by SM i and its proxies, the masks added by all proxies cancel the mask used by SM i . If all the SMs follow this masking technique, the resultant value after the aggregation should be the summation of all fine-grained readings. Masks are used to achieve privacy preservation and collusion resistance as will be explained in Section VI.
2) Mask Calculation: In EPIC, masks can be computed offline and efficiently as follows: s
is a keyed hash function and K (s) i,j is a short-time symmetric key that can be computed by the procedure that is explained in the next section, Y i and Y j are the public keys of the meter SM i and the proxy P i,j , respectively, day is a unique day's date, and t x is a sequence number of the readings of one day. Obviously, no other entity can derive the masks because it does not know the shared key.
B. Efficient Key Agreement Procedure
Each meter needs to share a key with each proxy to efficiently calculate the secret mask. In this section, we describe two key agreement procedures to establish long-term and short-term keys. Initially, a long-term symmetric seed key K i,j , Fig. 2 . SM i masks its reading with secrets shared with proxies, and each proxy removes one secret from the mask by adding the mask to its reading. shared between SM i and its proxy P i,j should be established and refreshed over a long period. Then, a short-term key K
is efficiently computed using the long-term key.
1) Long-Term Seed Key Agreement: To share a long-term seed key K i,j with each proxy P i,j , SM i chooses a random element v i,j ∈ Z * q and composes a key establishment request (KEReq) packet as shown in Fig. 3 . The packet contains id i , v i,j P, TS i , σ i , and cert i , where v i,j P is the random element v i,j multiplied by the generator P of the additive group G 1 , σ i is a signature and σ i = x i H 2 (id i , v i,j P, TS i ), H 2 is a hash function defined as H 2 : {0, 1} * → G 1 , and cert i is the certificate of SM i . Finally, SM i sends the KEReq packet to its proxies. Each proxy P i,j verifies that the packet is not stale by checking the timestamp (TS i ) to thwart replay attacks. Then, P i,j uses SM i 's public key, Y i = x i P, to verify the signature σ i by checkinĝ e(σ i , P)
The signature verification proof is as follows:
If the signature is successfully verified, each proxy P i,j chooses a random element v j,i ∈ Z * q and computes v j,i P. Moreover, P i,j calculates the long-term seed key K j,i = v j,i v i,j P. Finally, it sends the key establishment response (KERes) packet to SM i . As shown in the figure, the packet has id j , v j,i P, TS j , H 1 (K j,i , 1), σ j , and cert j , where σ j = x j H 2 (id j , v j,i P, TS j , H 1 (K j,i , 1)), H 1 () is a hash function (such as SHA-1), and H 1 (K j,i , 1) is used for key confirmation. When SM i receives the packet, it checks the timestamp and verifies the signature similar to the verification process done by the proxy. Then, it computes the long-term seed key 
Finally, it sends a key confirmation packet (KConf ) to P i,j so that P i,j knows that SM i has successfully computed the long-term key.
2) Short-Term Key Computation: The long-term key K i,j is used as a seed for the computation of the short-term keys. First, SM i and P i,j use the seed key to compute bidirectional (forward and backward) hash chains as shown in Fig. 4 . For the forward chain, both SM i and P i,j compute F 1 = H 1 (K i,j , TS, 1), where TS is the timestamp. Then, all the elements of the forward hash chain are computed using F a = H 1 (F a−1 ) for 2 ≤ a ≤ T, where T is the number of short-term keys that need to be stored. Similarly, the backward hash chain is computed by first computing
, then the elements of the backward hash chain are computed as
Finally, the short-term key is computed by XORing an element from the forward chain with the corresponding element from the backward chain and hashing the result as shown in the figure. Each short-term key should be used for a short time and after using all the T keys, the meters can compute a new set of keys using an updated TS. In this way, the SMs do not need to compute and store a large number of keys in each round. Short-term keys are computed daily and each key should be used to compute a set of masks. After using the long-term key for a certain time, SM i and P i,j should establish a new long-term seed key, and derive a new set of short-term keys.
V. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we give the details of EPIC starting by system setup. Then, we show how SMs report and aggregate power consumption readings. Finally, we illustrate how the utility can recover the aggregated reading, verify its integrity, users' authenticity, and generate electricity bills for each user.
A. System Setup
An offline trusted authority (TA) should bootstrap the system as follows. First, the TA generates the bilinear mapping parameters (q, G 1 , G 2 , P,ê). It also chooses three different hash functions. H 1 is a regular hash function such as SHA-1, H 2 : {0, 1} * → G 1 , and H is a homomorphic hash function with the generators {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P d } ∈ G. Furthermore, a keyed hash function mac i,u ← HMAC K i,u (h) is selected, where mac i,u is the HMAC on h using the symmetric key K i,u . Then, the TA publishes the system public parameters as pubs = {q, P, P 1 ,
In addition, every SM i chooses a secret key x i ∈ Z * q and computes the corresponding public key Y i = x i P. It should also obtain a certificate for the public key from a certificate authority. Finally, each SM i should select several proxies, assuming that SM i selects α i proxies and be selected by β i meters to act as a proxy for them, i.e., the total number of proxies for SM i is λ i = α i + β i . Each SM and its proxies should establish the long-term seed key, derive the short-term keys, and compute the shared masks as explained in Section IV.
B. Leaf Meters: Report Generation
Each leaf meter SM c generates a power consumption report by executing the following steps.
1) Masks its reading r c to obtain a masked reading m c
2) Hashes its masked reading m c using homomorphic hash function
3) Computes HMAC on h c using the shared key with the utility as mac c,
Finally, SM c transmits to its parent SM i the following tuple:
(3)
C. Nonleaf Nodes: Data Verification and Report Generation
The operations done by nonleaf meters SM i and the gateway can be divided into two phases. In the first phase, SM i receives n i messages from its children and verifies the authenticity and integrity of the received messages. In the second phase, SM i create a new message to be transmitted to the next parent. These two phases should be executed at each nonleaf node until the aggregated masked reading reaches the utility. The details of the two phases are as follows.
Phase 1: SM i receives n i messages from each child meter SM c (1 c n i ). If the child is a leaf-node, its message has this format (m c , TS, h c , mac c,u , σ c ) while if the child is a nonleaf node, the message has the following format
where M c and MAC c are aggregated masked reading and aggregated MAC computed by the nonleaf child SM c as defined in Table II . Also, the message contains the hashes of the masked readings of the subtree nodes of child SM c . SM i should perform the following verifications.
1) Perform a batch verification for the received signatureŝ 
If this verification passes, SM i moves to the next step, otherwise, data modification attack is detected and SM i can identify the attacker by applying divide-and-conquer verification recursively until the attacker is identified. 3) Store the latest received tuple (M c , MAC c , σ c ) from every child to help the utility to identify the attacker in case that the utility detects data modification attack, as will be explained in the next section. Phase 2: In this phase, SM i should execute the following steps before sending a reading packet to its parent.
1) Masks its fine-grained reading r i to obtain its own masked reading m i
2) Aggregates its masked reading m i with the masked readings received from its children meters to generate an aggregated masked readings M i as
3) Hashes its masked reading m i using homomorphic hash function to get h i as
4) Computes HMAC on h i with the shared key with the utility as mac i,u = HMAC K i,u (h i ). 5) Aggregates its MAC with the received aggregated MACs using XOR operations to obtain MAC i = mac i,u ⊕ ( n i c=1 MAC c ). 6) Generates a signature σ i = x i H 2 (M i , MAC i , TS). Finally, SM i sends to its parent SM pi the following tuple:
This process of verification and aggregation proceeds in a bottom-up manner to the utility. 
If the verification passes, the utility can recover the aggregated reading of all SMs by removing its masks from M gw by
where n is the total number of meters in the AMI network.
2) Attacker Identification: If an SM i modifies both aggregated masked reading and a homomorphic hash of any child in its subtree, i.e., transmits M c and h c instead of M c and h c to bypass its parent verification done in (5) , then the utility verification done in (10) fails because MAC c was computed by SM c on h c not h c . In this case, data modification attack is detected and the utility suspects all nonleaf SMs since any nonleaf SM can launch this attack. Therefore, the utility runs the following verifications in a bottom-up manner, i.e., starting from the first nonleaf nodes up to the last nonleaf node which is the gateway, until the attacker is identified.
In order to identify the attacker, the utility should retrieve
If SM i can provide valid signatures from its children, it can pass the verification done in (12), otherwise, SM i is identified as an attacker. The attacking SM can pass this verification iff he sends the correct M c not M c , however, it will be identified by the next verification process. If the verification in (12) passes for all nonleaf nodes, then the utility should to check the correctness of the messages sent by each meter SM i . First, the utility extracts its individual masked reading from the aggregated masked reading M i using
Then, it recalculates mac i,u from the verified masked readings as
After that, the utility recalculates mac i,u from the verified aggregated MACs as
Finally, the utility checks if
If the verification fails, SM i is identified as an attacker. This process continues in a bottom-up manner until the attacker is identified. The attacker cannot pass this check because he cannot compute a valid mac value for the modified packet. This is because the computation of a valid mac value requires the knowledge of the shared key between the victim meter, SM c , and the utility. Therefore, EPIC can ensure EtoE data integrity and authenticity without accessing the fine-grained readings to preserve consumers' privacy. 3) Dynamic-Pricing-Based Billing: For dynamic pricing, the utility can divide the day into periods with different electricity prices. Assuming that the meters should report w power consumption readings during each billing period, Table III gives the w masked readings generated by n meters, where each column represents the masked readings sent in one time slot, while each row represents all the masked readings sent by each meter during the billing period (i.e., w readings). As explained earlier, the reading r i of SM i at a time slot t x is masked using the mask α i j=1 s
j,i to produce the masked reading
The masks should be computed in such a way that the summation of all the masks used during billing period is zero. This can be done as follows. At the end of each billing period (report at t w ), the mask SM i should use is equal to the negative summation of all the previous w − 1 masks plus a billing mask, s (b) i,u , shared between the meter and the utility, i.e., the mask used in the last reading of a billing period is
so that the summation of all masked readings of SM i gives the total power consumed by SM i plus the billing mask, i.e., i ) since all the masks are canceled and the total consumption of a billing period is not a large number, but it is extremely hard to obtain m i from h i since the masks can make m i a large number. Knowing the power consumption of SM i during the billing period does not degrade consumers' privacy because the time period is long enough to prevent sensitive data leakage [20] .
VI. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
A. Privacy Analysis 1) Singular Attacks: An adversary, A, can eavesdrop on all the communications of all the network nodes and can obtain the individual masked readings of a leaf SM. However, based on (1), A must know all the λ c masks, λ c = α c + β c , shared between the leaf meter, SM c , and its proxies to be able to extract the meter's fine-grained reading. Since no entity can compute the correct masks except SM c and its proxies, as explained in Section IV-B, A cannot obtain the meters' finegrained readings.
In the following, we present a formal security proof to show that the masking technique used in EPIC is semantic secure against chosen-plaintext attacks even if only one mask value is used to mask the fine-grained reading.
Theorem 1: The masking scheme is semantically secure against chosen-plaintext attacks under the pseudorandom function (PRF) assumption for HMAC.
Proof: The theorem proof as a game is constructed as follows.
1) Initialization: The challenger C is initiated with a set of one-time secret masks generated as explained in Section IV-A using the HMAC function which is used as a PRF [21] . 2) Challenge: The adversary A outputs two fine-grained readings r 0 and r 1 to C. C chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and responds with a ciphertext m b = Enc(r b ) = r b + s, where s is the one-time secret mask and s r b . 3) Guess: The adversary A responds with b ∈ {0, 1} as a guess for b. The advantage of the adversary against the masking in the above game can be defined as
Because s r b , s is generated by a PRF and used only one time, the advantage Adv A in this case becomes
Therefore, the masking scheme is semantically secure and no adversary can extract the fine-grained reading. In addition, each mask value is used for only one reporting period to ensure that the masked readings look different even if the leaf meter reports the same fine-grained reading at different time slots. Therefore, given two consecutive reports of a meter, A cannot learn if the power consumption has changed or not.
2) Collusion Attacks: Unlike the singular attacks launched by a single adversary, we consider in the following a stronger attack in which the adversary can collude with other nodes in the AMI networks.
In EPIC, the fine-grained reading of each meter is protected by λ secret masks shared with λ proxies. Therefore, for an attacker to compute the fine-grained reading of a victim meter, the attacker must collude at least with all the victim's proxies. In particular, the attacker can try to recover the fine-grained reading of a victim meter from either its masked reading or its homomorphic hash.
To recover the fine-grained reading of a victim leaf meter from its masked reading, the attacker must collude with all the victim's proxies to obtain all secret masks and use them to get the fine-grained reading from the masked reading given in (1) . If the victim is a nonleaf meter, based on (7), the attacker must collude with both victim's direct children and proxies.
On the other hand, to recover the fine-grained reading of a victim meter from its homomorphic hash, based on (2) or (8), the attacker must collude with all the victim's proxies to remove the hashes of the secret masks and obtain the H(r i ) from H(m i ). Since the value of r i is a small number, the attacker can build a look-up table and recover r i from H(r i ).
In all the previous attack scenarios, the protection level against collusion attack is determined by the number of selected proxies λ. Therefore, in the following, we model an attack and investigate how a proper value for λ can ensure a satisfactory protection level against collusion attack.
Consider that each SM selects λ proxies, the network has n nodes, including SMs, the gateway, and the utility, and the network has m malicious nodes that collude with the attacker. The probability that an SM selects all the λ proxies from the m malicious nodes follows the hypergeometric probability distribution and is given by:
Then, the probability that a meter is secure against collusion attack is
Let P be the probability that the attacker can recover at least the readings of any SM in the (n − m) benign meters. P can be expressed as
To assess how hard for the attackers to launch successful collusion attack in EPIC, Fig. 5 gives P versus m at different cases of λ for n = 200 SMs. As shown in the figure, if each SM selects λ = 8 proxies and 60 SMs colludes with the attacker, the probability that the attacker can obtain at least one meter's readings is almost zero. The attacker needs to collude with 80 SMs, 40% of the SMs in the network, so that the probability he can get at least one meter's readings becomes 0.06. If each SM increases the level of protection against collusion attacks by adding four more proxies, i.e., increasing λ from 8 to 12, the SMs are almost secure when the attacker colludes with 80 SMs. In this case, the attacker needs to collude with 120 SMs, 60% of the network, so that P becomes 0.12. We can conclude that, the increase of the number of proxies (λ) can make collusion attack harder to succeed.
To illustrate how many proxies should be selected by each SM to be secure against collusion attacks, Fig. 6 shows λ versus n such that P ≤ 0.01. We define m/n as the ratio of malicious nodes in the network. An SM can select a proper number of proxies to be secure against collusion attack based on the network size and a risk assessment for the number of potential malicious meters in the network. For example, for a network with 100 SMs and 40 SMs of them are malicious, an SM can be secured by selecting nine proxies, whereas, if the network size increases to 2000 SMs and 800 of them are malicious, i.e., same m/n ratio, the SM should increase the number of proxies from 9 to 12 to ensure that the probability of successful collusion attack is less than 0.01. This indicates that although the number of SMs significantly increases from 100 to 2000, a slight increase in the number of proxies is needed to secure the meters against collusion attacks. Moreover, in an extreme case in which m/n = 0.6 and n = 2000, 22 proxies are needed to ensure that P ≤ 0.01. We can conclude from this analysis that SMs can control the protection level against collusion attacks by selecting a proper number of proxies, and the ratio of proxies to the network size (λ/n) is small to achieve a satisfactory protection against collusion attacks.
B. Security Analysis
1) Data Integrity: If an external adversary A manipulates the transmitted messages between a child meter and its parent, the attack can be easily detected by the parent because it can verify the integrity of the received messages by verifying the received signature. Forging a signature or modifying a valid signature is infeasible without knowing the private key of the child meter. In addition, A may record valid packets exchanged between a meter and its parent (such as the packets given in (3) and (9) and replay them at later time to disrupt the reading collection scheme. Since packets have timestamps, the stale packets can be easily identified and dropped. If A tries to change the timestamp so that the packet looks fresh, A needs to know the private key of the victim meter to compute a valid signature on the packet of the modified timestamp.
Comparing to external attackers, internal attacks can launch stronger attacks. In particular, they may breach the data integrity by launching three different attacks.
1) Modification of a child's homomorphic hash only.
2) Modification of a child's masked reading only.
3) Modification of both child's homomorphic hash and masked reading. Consider SM c be the victim child, SM i be the malicious parent, and SM pi be the parent of SM i . SM pi can either detect the attack of SM i or help the utility to detect the attack. The first two attacks can be detected by SM pi because the batch verification process of the individual homomorphic hash values done by SM pi [given in (5) ] fails. For the third attack, modification of both M c and h c , the utility can detect the attack from the aggregated MAC verification done in (10) . To identify the malicious SM i , the utility should use the procedure explained in Section V-D. Therefore, EPIC can ensure EtoE data integrity without accessing the fine-grained readings to preserve consumers' privacy.
2) EtoE Users' Authenticity: EPIC achieves HbyH authentication in which each parent meter can authenticate the child meters because each packet is signed by the child meter. Therefore, it is infeasible for A to impersonate meters by sending packets under their names, and thus parent meters accept only messages from authenticated children. In addition, EPIC can also ensure EtoE authenticity since the verification process done by the utility in Section V-D requires the use of symmetric keys shared between the utility and each legitimate user in the AMI network. Therefore, successful verification process means that the received aggregated reading was computed from the intended system users.
3) Key Agreement: a) Long-term key agreement: The security of the key computation, shown in Fig. 3 , relies on the hardness of the discrete-logarithmic problem. If A eavesdrops on the communication between SM i and P i,j given in Fig. 3 , he can obtain v i,j P and v j,i P. However, given v i,j P and P, it is b) Short-term key agreement: For backward and forward secrecy, as shown in Fig. 4 , given the current short-term key, A can compute neither the past keys nor the future keys. Assuming an attacker could obtain a short-term key K
i,j because the hash function is irreversible.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we first evaluate EPIC in terms of the communication and computation overheads for the single-hop model, then, we present our ns-3 experiment results to assess the network performance for the single-hop and multihop models.
A. Computation and Communication Overhead
To evaluate the communication and computation overheads of EPIC, we implemented the required cryptographic operations using Python charm cryptographic library [22] running on an Intel Core i7-4765T 2.00 GHz and 8-GB RAM. We used supersingular elliptic curve with the symmetric type 1 pairing of size 512 bits (SS512 curve) for bilinear pairing and a standard elliptic curve secp160r1 for the homomorphic hash function [23] . All cryptographic operations were run 1000 times and average measurements are reported in Table IV (top). Since we compare the overhead of EPIC to the proposed schemes in [6] , [8] , and [10] , we include in Table IV (bottom) the computation measurements of the cryptographic operations needed in these schemes.
1) Computation Overhead: The computation overhead is defined as the processing time required by each node in the network. These nodes are SMs, the gateway and the utility.
For the single hop model, the time-consuming operations required by SMs are one homomorphic hash generation which requires T 6 ; one HMAC generation which requires T 8 ; and one signature generation which requires T 4 + T 5 . Using the measurements in Table IV , the total time required by each meter is 2.79 ms. For n SMs, the computations required by the gateway are batch signatures verification [as in (4) ] which requires (n + 1)T 1 + (n − 1)T 2 + (n − 1)T 3 + nT 4 ; batch homomorphic hashes verification [as in (5) ] which requires T 6 +(n−1)T 7 ; one homomorphic hash generation which requires T 6 ; one HMAC generation which requires T 8 ; and one signature generation which requires T 4 + T 5 . The total time required by the gateway for these operations is 1.0836n + 5.1128 ms. For the utility, one signature verification operation plus n HMAC computations are required to verify the received packet and one arithmetic addition operation to obtain the aggregated reading. These operations require 0.001n+2.1037 ms. For the schemes in [6] , [8] , and [10] , we followed the same procedure to compute the computation overhead of each entity and the results are shown in Fig. 7 . As shown in Fig. 7(a) , EPIC imposes the least computation overhead on the SMs comparing to the existing schemes. This is because EPIC uses efficient masking technique, while the other schemes use computationally extensive operations to encrypt the fine-grained readings. For the gateway, Fig. 7(b) shows that the computational overhead of the gateway in EPIC is found to be close to those of [8] and [10] . For the computation overhead of the utility, EPIC is more efficient than the existing schemes because simple arithmetic addition is needed to remove the utility mask and recover the aggregated reading as shown in (11) , while in the schemes of [6] , [8] , and [10] , time-consuming decryption operation is needed, as given in the lower part of Section IV. In addition, as shown in Fig. 7(c) , the proposed schemes in [6] , [8] , and [10] have constant computation time because the utility decrypts only one aggregated ciphertext regardless of the number of SMs, whereas in EPIC, the utility's computation overhead increases linearly at a rate of 1.31 μs/SM because the utility receives one homomorphic hash for every SM, and thus more operations are needed. However, the utility's computation overhead of EPIC is much less than those of the other schemes.
2) Communication Overhead: The communication overhead is measured by the size of transmitted messages between the network entities in bytes. In specific, we evaluate SM-togateway and gateway-to-utility communication overhead.
The SM-to-gateway communication overhead in EPIC can be computed using the packet format in (3) as follows. Each SM transmits a 16-byte masked reading, a 4-byte timestamp, a 20-byte homomorphic hashes, a 16-byte MAC, and a 64-byte signature. Therefore, the total size of an SM's message is 120 bytes. For a network of size n, the communication overhead between all SMs and the gateway is 120n. On the other hand, the gateway-to-utility communication overhead depends mainly on n which is the total number of SMs in the network. The total size of the gateway message to the utility is 20n + 100 bytes. We used the same procedure to compute the communication overhead of the proposed schemes in [6] , [8] , and [10] .
The values of computations and communication overhead presented in this section were used within the ns-3 simulation presented in the following section.
B. Experiment and Measurement Results
1) Experimental Setup:
We used network simulator ns-3.27 [24] to assess the impact of the communication/computation overhead reduction on the network performance. We implemented a wireless mesh network that mimics the AMI network using IEEE 802.11s standard. The underlying MAC protocol is IEEE 802.11g. TCP was used at the transport layer for a reliable communication, and maximum segment size (MSS) is 536 bytes.
We created grid topologies of size N, where N ∈ {36, 49, 64, 81, 100, 121, 144, 169}. For each N, we ran the schemes for 30 rounds and average results are reported. One of the nodes in each topology acts as the gateway while the other (N − 1) nodes act as SMs.
At the beginning of each data collection cycle, each meter reports its power consumption reading to the gateway. We assumed that the data collection is performed periodically every 60 s [25] . We simulated two different network models: EtoE and HbyH. In EtoE data collection model, all SMs simultaneously report their readings to the gateway directly and multihop packet relay may be needed. In HbyH model, a minimum spanning tree of the network is created, and parentchild relationships are assigned. Moreover, in HbyH model, leaf meters send their readings to their parent meter periodically, the parent meter aggregates its reading with the readings received from the child meters, and sends an aggregated reading to their parent meter. This process goes on up to the gateway. Finally, the gateway aggregates the readings received from its child meters and sends an aggregated reading to the utility.
2) Baselines and Performance Metrics: We use three existing works [6] , [8] , [10] as baselines to compare the performance of EPIC. In [6] , the meters send their readings in blinded form, and the data aggregation is performed on ciphertext. The total power usage can be recovered by computing a discrete log problem. The scheme in [8] uses Paillier cryptosystem to perform data aggregation using partially homomorphic encryption. This baseline generates larger data packets when compared to [6] . The last baseline [10] also uses Paillier cryptosystem, but it differs from [8] in that it uses two signatures for each report. Hence, Li and Luo [10] introduced extra overhead. For performance evaluation, we used the following metrics. 1) Average Completion Time (CT): It is the elapsed time for gathering all the measurement data from all of the nodes and aggregating them at the gateway in one cycle. We measure CT at the application layer so that the cryptographic operations are taken into account. 2) Throughput (TP): It is the average amount of data received by the gateway per second. This parameter is an indicator for the bandwidth usage of each scheme, i.e., as measurement of this metric increases, as it is worse.
3) Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR):
It is the ratio of the number of packets received by the gateway to the number of packets that are expected to be received by the gateway. Fig. 8(a) and (d) , we present the data collection CT values. As the network grows, the time required to complete a data collection cycle increases. In both data collection methods, EPIC requires the least time for all topology sizes in a round because it both has a moderate processing delay for aggregation and generates comparable size of power readings. In addition, the approaches require similar amount of time for data collection until 81-node topologies. Thereafter, the values dramatically increase for EtoE data collection. This difference can be attributed to the propagation delay mostly. It includes backoff waitings due to external collisions while accessing the medium to transmit the data packets and the path discovery process performed by the HWMP which is default routing protocol of IEEE 802.11s standard [26] . The EtoE data collection typically needs more hops to deliver data packets to the destination because parent and child meters are one-hop neighbors of each other in the data reporting hierarchy trees. Thus, the data packets are exposed to more backoff waitings on the path toward the destination. This results in a dramatic increase in EtoE data collection. Also, we would like to point out the remarkable difference between [10] and the other approaches. Although Li and Luo [10] took shorter than [6] does to perform cryptographic operations, it incurs an extra delay due to the segmentation by TCP at the transport layer. Since Li and Luo [10] generated larger data packets than MSS, a power reading is transmitted in multiple segments, which results in an extra delay due to the extra backoff waitings.
3) Simulation Results and Discussion: In
It can be seen that in HbyH data collection that the approaches require far less time to complete a data collection round. Also, they have similar values for all topology sizes. Since parent and child meters are one-hop neighbor of each other, the backoff waitings decrease thanks to less competition in medium access. EPIC slightly outperforms the other approaches. It always requires less time than the other approaches do to complete a data collection round. Although it incurs similar processing delay for aggregation and generates larger aggregated readings beyond a level of the hierarchy tree toward the gateway, it requires the least time. This is because EPIC takes advantage of far shorter propagation delays below that level thanks to smaller aggregated power readings [27] .
Second, we analyze the TP performance to discuss the bandwidth usage of the approaches. As shown in Fig. 8(b) and (e), the approaches produce more TP at the gateway in the EtoE data collection when compared to the TP values for the HbyH data collection. This is because power readings are aggregated at some intermediate meters in the HbyH model. Hence, average amount of data received by the gateway decreases. Li and Luo [10] produced the most TP in both EtoE and HbyH data collection methods since it generates the biggest data packets compared to the others. It is followed by Fan et al. [6] and Shen et al. [8] , respectively. EPIC produces the least TP because it generates the smallest data packets for power readings. The TP values linearly increase in EtoE data collection because the number of power readings delivered to the gateway increases as the network grows. However, in HbyH data collection, the TP that EPIC produces at the gateway linearly increases while the others remain constant although the number of power readings reported by each approach is the same at each topology size. The additional overhead is required to achieve EtoE data integrity, authenticity and dynamic pricing that are not achieved in the other schemes.
We investigate the PDR values in order to find out how reliable the schemes are. As shown in Fig. 8(c) and (f), all schemes achieve more than 89% PDR. Also, all the scheme achieves the same PDR which indicates that the PDR depends on the network topology, i.e., how the SMs are organized, not the data collection scheme. While the schemes can achieve 100% at each topology size in the HbyH data collection, the values slightly decrease after 81-node topology in the EtoE data collection. This is due to the loss of one of three-way handshake messages between the gateway and a physically distant node (especially the nodes at the edge of the network) in the network. The TCP is a connection-oriented communication protocol, so it needs to establish a connection before sending data packets. As the number of hops between the hosts increases, it is more likely to lose any of the three-way handshake messages. Since there is a limit to retransmit these messages, it is likely to fail a connection. If the connection fails, the data packets cannot be transferred, and this results in lower PDR values.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a scheme called EPIC. EPIC enables the utility to verify the integrity of the aggregated reading and identify the attackers without accessing the individual readings to preserve privacy. The utility can also generate electricity bills based on dynamic prices without violating consumers' privacy. A formal security proof, and a probabilistic model are provided to demonstrate that EPIC can preserve the consumers' privacy with EtoE data integrity and high protection against collusion attacks. Moreover, we evaluated the performance of EPIC using ns-3 and the measurements demonstrated that EPIC is efficient when compared to similar existing schemes and can collect periodic power consumption data in the AMI network without consuming excessive bandwidth so that the other types of traffic can obtain more bandwidth.
